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Recombinant resilience and the temptations of global interdiction 
Martin Coward, Newcastle University, UK 
 
Introduction 
 
The early twenty-first century has been characterised by the emergence, refinement and 
entrenchment of a distinctive mode of warfare. Sometimes characterised as a ‘global civil war’ 
(Alexander, 2008; Tonnesson and Goldblat, 2002), this mode of warfare is framed as a 
militarised antagonism between the United States (US) and its allies on the one hand and a 
global array of perceived terrorists and their sponsors on the other (United States Department 
of Defense, 2006, pp. 20–24). While initially conceived in the language of inter-state conflict, 
this violence is better understood as a ‘global counterinsurgency’ (Roper, 2008). Instead of 
states at war (with one another) global counterinsurgency comprises a globalised state of war.1 
Indeed, even though initial forays into this counterinsurgency were aimed at the governing 
authorities in Afghanistan and Iraq, the intent was to pre-empt the perceived threat of a so-
called global terrorism waged by an array of non-state adversaries against the citizens and 
values – rather than states – of the US and its allies. In what follows I investigate this 
globalisation of counterinsurgency in order to delineate the central organising trope of this 
state of war. 
 
The evolution of a global counterinsurgency 
 
The origins of global counterinsurgency can be traced to post-Cold War interventions in Iraq, 
Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Framed in 'humanitarian' terms, these interventions signalled the 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting that ‘state’ here captures at least 3 senses;  juridical-territorial political entity; mode of existence; 
and condition. In addition, as a verb rather than noun, ‘state’ captures a performative dimension that will also be 
central to my discussion in this chapter. 
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perceived legitimacy of military intervention to realise the liberal foreign policy aims of the 
advanced industrial states that comprise NATO: in particular the protection of the individual 
through norms of Human Rights.2 Put differently, these interventions comprised a militarised 
response to perceived counter-liberal forces that threatened the propagation of global human 
rights norms in the post-Cold War era. Discursively these forces were positioned as linked 
insofar as each comprised a test for post-Cold War liberal order that, were the latter to fail, 
would open the door for other adversaries. In the absence of the bipolar stalemate, the liberal 
post-Cold War order created a sense of identity through a narrative of being besieged by 
multiple, linked counter-liberal forces with a singular purpose: to destroy nascent global norms 
focused on the promotion and protection of the individual (politically, economically, 
culturally).3 Faced with such a threat the post-Cold War liberal order, led by the US, developed 
a discourse, if not doctrine, of intervention that reached its apex with the publication of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to 
Protect (2001). 
 
Central to this discourse of intervention was the perception that global dynamics – particularly 
the transnational interconnections commonly referred to as 'globalisation' – were key to 
understanding the manner in which those insurgent forces were enabled, assembled and 
equipped (Kaldor, 2012). The discourse of a globalised illiberal threat was galvanised by the 
attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th 2001 and the ensuing 'Global War 
Against Terror'. In the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center a narrative 
emerged drawing together the various attacks on the US and its allies in the preceding 10 years 
and positing the need for a more muscular and robust response (Posen, 2001). This narrative 
                                                 
2 Here I take ‘liberal’ to refer to multiple and complex phenomena. Uppermost in most accounts of 
liberalism in international politics are its idealistic vision of interconnection reducing the scope for global 
conflict (cf. Doyle 1986). Similarly, references to (neo)liberalism as a social-economic system tend to 
stress a distinctive form of economic organisation: specifically, the globalisation of a free market 
ideology (cf. Harvey 2005). However, from the perspective of political philosophy the heart of liberal 
values is a defence of the autonomous individual (cf. MacPherson, 1962).  
3 Perhaps the best known example of this narrative is Huntington’s notion of the ‘west versus the rest’ 
(2012, pp. 39–41). Hammond (2007) attributes the spectacular nature of intervention to a search for 
meaningful identity in the post-Cold War era. 
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portrayed the liberal order propagated by the US and its allies as threatened by a cooption of 
the very dynamics that had enabled the liberal order to prosper: namely the interconnections 
and technologies of globalization (Cronin, 2003). Global travel, communications, information 
technology and even the globalisation of norms and ideas (insofar as these were expressed in 
the ideas of a global Ummah) were the means by which an insurgency would reach the very 
heart of the global liberal order (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; cf. Roy, 2004).  
 
While initially focusing on the perceived state sponsors of such an insurgency (the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan and the Hussein Regime in Iraq) this narrative very quickly 
expanded to comprise an interventionist call for a wider counterinsurgent effort to safeguard 
the perceived good of a global liberal order.4 Such a narrative quickly moved to justify the 
preemptive targeting of perceived insurgents who supposedly threatened the underpinnings of 
that order (Kegley and Raymond, 2003). Pre-emption was a short step from intervention, global 
targeting a logical endpoint of the military-technological forces assembled to enable interstate 
intervention. As such global counterinsurgency was born: an omnivalent strategy of pre-
emptive targeting of that which is perceived to threaten liberal norms (of individuality, choice, 
freedom, markets) and the techno-logistical structures that underpins them.  
 
The so-called war on terror has thus evolved from the initial targeting of particular international 
rogue states into a permanent, global dynamic of preemptive organised violence. Nothing 
perhaps exemplifies this better than recent killings carried out by US forces in Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia. The shooting of Osama bin Laden by a US Navy SEAL team in his compound in 
Northern Pakistan has resonances with drone strikes on Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and 
members of al-Shabaab in Somalia. Each of these attacks comprises an intervention across 
commonly accepted lines of international jurisdiction in order to target pre-emptively a threat 
deemed capable of bringing violence to the citizens of the US or its allies directly (as in the case 
of 9/11) or indirectly (as in the case of targeting of tourists in Bali). Each attack is intended to 
                                                 
4 This is the narrative of the ‘long war’ formalised in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (United 
States Department of Defense, 2006) 
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disrupt the capabilities of a dispersed insurgent threat through the removal of key agents. Each 
is the product of a complex, transnational military-political assemblage comprising political-
legal narratives, human and machine compiled intelligence, complex databases and guidance 
systems as well as weapons systems that allow for an agile deployment that evades or occludes 
the traditional boundaries that have circumscribed conflict zones. The end result is a 
counterinsurgency that is global in scope and transnational in character (cf. Gregory, 2011). 
 
 
The network trope and global battlespace 
 
Global counterinsurgency is an all encompassing discourse that posits its terrain of operation as 
a global battlespace. This concept of a global battlespace is predicated on an underlying 
discursive framing that posits commonalities between insurgents, their targets and the 
responses of counterinsurgency forces. In other words, the capacities and potentialities of 
object and actors within this global battlespace are derived from a perceived common set of 
characteristics. In particular, global battlespace is underpinned by a trope which envisages 
existence as a set of labile, flexible interconnections between multiple shifting nodal points: in 
short, a network. It is the flexibility of interconnections between individuals, cells and 
ideologues that defines the particular virulence that is said to attach to the contemporary 
insurgent threat. It is the dependence upon the interconnections of information, 
communication, transport and logistics infrastructures that define the contemporary 
vulnerability of the homeland. And it is the agility of densely interconnected forces that is said 
to comprise the strength of current counterinsurgent doctrine. In other words, underlying the 
concept of a global battlespace is the trope of the network: a web of interconnective links 
between a constellation of points.  
 
Ubiquitous in the contemporary period the network has become an onto-epistemological prism 
through which the capacities and potentialities of the globalised era have been refracted. As 
Wigley (2001, pp. 83–4) notes: ‘We are constantly surrounded by talk of networks. Every third 
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message, article, and advertisement seems to be about one network or another... Nowhere 
escapes the net.’ Indeed, the network has been ubiquitous in accounts of the threats and 
vulnerabilities central to contemporary international security whether these are the spatially 
dispersed, horizontally affiliated ‘brand’ terrorism (Zelinsky and Shubik, 2009) associated with 
al-Qaeda, the nuclear proliferation associated with A Q Khan (Albright and Hinderstein, 2005), 
or the hackers leading both state and non-state strategies of ‘cyberwar’ (cf. Décary-Hétu and 
Dupont, 2012). In a seemingly endless chain of self-referral, threats to the network are made by 
networked threats that demand, in turn, the adoption of the capacities that make the network 
what it is by those that would defend it.  
 
In light of this ubiquity one would expect the ‘potential “powers” of [networks]’ to be well 
defined. On the contrary, Hayward Alker (2011, p. 355) notes that ‘their conceptual 
presuppositions and potential pathologies are ... not clear’. The conceptual assumptions – and 
the pathologies these entail – of the network trope are key to understanding the assemblage of 
global counterinsurgency. I will contend that the network comprises an organising onto-
epistemological trope that structures our understanding of political violence in a distinctive 
manner. This trope carries certain assumptions as well as certain entailments that, once 
unpacked, reveal troubling questions about the deployment of organised violence.  
 
The geometry of networks: beyond planes and contiguity 
 
As a trope, the network is constitutive of a particular political imaginary: it refers to, or 
performs, a perceived ontological entity, its dynamics, capabilities and potentialities. When 
viewed through the onto-epistemological prism of the network ‘the world’ is understood to be 
composed and structured in particular ways. Networks are accordingly seen to acquire specific 
capabilities and potentialities (and, by extension, pathologies). Such an understanding of the 
network trope inverts the positivist assumption that networks and networking are ontologically 
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real independently of our understanding of the world.5 On the contrary, it is the conceptual 
trope of the network that structures what we take to be ontologically real. Such an inversion 
suggests that, rather than asking what properties networks ‘possess’, we might instead ask 
what the politico-military consequences of constituting the world as networked are: how does 
it performatively constitute distinctive state(s) of war. 
 
At the core of the network trope is a geometric image: a representation of the manner in which 
the network assembles entities into a distinctively spatialised ensemble. This geometric image 
is predicated on the twin figures of the node and the interconnection understood as linking 
line, or bond.  The entities assembled in the network are viewed as nodes, poles from and to 
which information, goods, power and waste ebb and flow. Abstracted from the assembled 
network, nodes form a flexible constellation of points: a cloud of entities without 
predetermined volume or spatial-cartographic coordinates. Just as a constellation of stars is a 
set of unrelated points linked only by the relationships ascribed by human imagination and 
perception, it is the linkages, the relations or bonds that give a particular network its 
dimensions and significance. Nodes only gain meaning insofar as they are connected to other 
nodes. Their capacities and significance in the network are a consequence of these 
interlinkages. Indeed, the node is a simply point of articulation, of relay or destination. It is the 
ways in which they are bound together, of how circuits of flow are established that gives a 
particular network its distinctive characteristics.  
 
Viewed geometrically, the network is a reticulated space, a set of interconnecting lines drawn – 
unevenly – between points.  The interconnecting lines of the network are substantially different 
to the grids of the cartographic imagination. While the latter organises space by imposing an 
                                                 
5 This is the central error of Chad Whelan’s  distinction between networks as metaphors and networks as 
method or unit of analysis (Whelan, 2012, p. 3). Whelan fails to note that insofar as all are tropes of 
thought, the latter are just as much a metaphor as the former. Indeed, Whelan misuses the concept of 
metaphor. It would be more accurate to say that while some writers use the metaphor of the network 
as an analogy, others deploy the metaphor to effect particular modes of investigation. In both cases the 
network is a trope of thought: a prism through which the world is refracted, not a simple tool or 
unmediated apprehension of the ontological nature of the world. 
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abstract measure on it, the former is a temporary, emergent form established by the 
contingent linking of otherwise disparate points. The interconnections in the network are not 
regular and shift as nodes are added or removed. Indeed, this is reflected in the evolution of 
the representational regime of network thinking (Wigley, 2001, pp. 108–110). Initial network 
thinking represented interconnection in a regular, orthogonal grid fashion – drawing, by 
analogy – on the modern urban plan epitomised by downtown Manhattan.6 However, later 
network thinking gravitated to representations of interconnection as a more fluid, irregular 
pattern akin to a spider’s web.7 It is precisely the irregularity of interconnection and thus the 
irregularity of the geometry of networks that is significant. No two networks are the same and 
in any given network the interconnections between nodes are not isomorphic. In this manner 
interconnections make each node, and each configuration of nodes specific, singular. The 
geometry of the network is thus that of a shifting constellation of nodes bound by irregular 
connections. This geometry, I would contend, has certain, linked entailments that are key to 
understanding the politico-military pathologies of network thinking. 
 
The nodal interconnection on which network geometry is predicated surpasses classical 
conceptions of territory. The latter are predicated on a distinctive geometrical image: a single 
uniform, continuous, planar surface that can be sub-divided into discrete, bounded domains. It 
is these bounded domains that constitute governable territories. The continuous nature of the 
planar surface out of which territories are carved is central to the geometry of territory. Both 
the whole plane itself and the bounded units into which it is divided must be continuous since 
to admit that there are either gaps, warps or glitches is to begin to question the integrity of 
territorial unit. We see this in the case of so-called ‘ungoverned’ areas such as North Western 
Pakistan or Somalia, each denied the proper status of territory as a consequence of being 
regarded as comprising gaps in the normally uniform territorial surface on which global politics 
is played out. 
                                                 
6 An early expression of the network as grid can be seen in Le Corbusier’s plans for urban traffic flow (cf. 
Le Corbusier, 1967) 
7 The hegemony of irregularity in representations of contemporary information networks is illustrated in 
detail by Manuel Lima (2011) 
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Central to the image of a uniform, continuous plane is the idea of contiguity. Any point within a 
territory is in principle connectable to another by moving through a succession of contiguous 
points that lie between them. Indeed, until the advent of air travel this was the principle 
manner in which territory was known – as a journey through a series of contiguous points. The 
importance of contiguity cannot be understated in relation to network thinking. Classical 
schemas of territory are informed by a sense of propinquity, of ‘next-to’ or ‘nearby-ness’. Each 
place has a sense of being located on a surface and thus of having neighbouring places. 
Similarly each territorial parcel or bounded unit is constituted by a sense of being a delimited 
part of a larger surface and thus surrounded by other such parts of that surface. Indeed, it is 
this sense of propinquity that is at the heart of classical schemas of international politics such as 
that espoused by Morgenthau (1985) or Waltz (1979): a schema in which states compete with 
each other as a consequence of the existential fact of their propinquity in a world of limited 
resources. 
 
Network thinking surpasses this classical territorial schema however, by displacing the 
importance of contiguity. Indeed, proximity in the network is a function of the interconnection 
of nodes rather than transit across a planar surface (Castells, 2000, p. 410). Nodal 
interconnections have no regard for the contiguous places that might have previously been 
conceived of as being ‘between’ nodes. The network is comprised of a series of interconnected 
points without any substantial surface between them. As such, this surpasses the classical 
conception of territoriality. This a-territoriality can be seen in the social network analysis of 
Valdis Krebs. Krebs’ rendering of the relationship between the 9/11 hijackers as a network 
(2002, fig. 4) has no regard to geo-spatial emplacement, no trace of the borders that might 
have been crossed or constitutive of their identity. The 9/11 hijackers are shown as nodes 
drawn into an a-territorial network by the relationships formed around the event of the 9/11 
hijackings. As such this network is a contingent, temporary, a-territorial entity.  
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The model for this deterritorialised cloud of interconnected nodes is the interconnections of 
information technology. The image of the cloud is ubiquitous in representations of information 
technology networks. Indeed, as Scanlon and Wieners (1999) note the cloud is ‘the icon of 
choice’ for representing the interconnections of the global networks that comprise the internet. 
Hal Burch and Bill Cheswick's Internet connectivity graph provides a visual representation of 
this cloud (Dodge and Kitchin, 2001, p. 43). This image of the cloud has been co-opted for 
networked warfighting doctrine: for example, the Ministry of Defence acknowledges that the 
swarms of drones it envisages delivering future warfighting capacity explicitly mirror such 
visualisations of the internet (2011, pp. 7–6). As William J Mitchell (1996, p. 23) noted as long 
ago as 1995 ‘[y]ou get from place to place in cyberspace by following logical links rather than 
physical paths’. Hence, Mitchell argued, information technology makes us connected, not 
contiguous (1996, pp. 21–24). Nowhere have this trope of connection been clearer than in 
discussions about the nature of global urbanisation. 
 
Networks and the Urbanisation of (In)Security 
 
Networks have refigured our understanding of urban life and space in the contemporary era. 
On an inter- and intra-urban scale, connection has been given increasing priority as the 
infrastructures of connection become ever denser as urbanisation progresses. As observers of 
recent urbanisation have noted, ‘institutions, buildings and urban districts ... become 
intensively woven together across international space through the mediating power of local-
global infrastructure networks’’ (Graham, 2002, p. 74; see also Sassen, 2001, pp. 171–196). 
Indeed, Taylor (2004, pp. 7–30) refers to this urban networking as the ‘second nature’ of cities. 
Inter-city networking is reflective of (though not isomorphic with) the intensification of intra-
urban infrastructural development. Global urbanisation is marked by the development of dense 
infrastructural networks that gather large swathes of geographically dispersed urban fabric into 
singular networks. Of course, neither inter- nor intra-urban networking is even. Indeed, the 
urbanism associated with contemporary global urbanisation is, as Graham and Marvin (2001) 
note, ‘splintered’. Infrastructure is itself splintered insofar as it is bundled up into discrete, 
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private ventures. As this splintering proceeds, so infrastructures fragment cities and 
communities according to the differential access they are afforded. Indeed, as Graham (2002, p. 
74) notes, ‘global relational connections can...be combined with very powerful local 
disconnections ... local-global infrastructure networks ... can ... cease to be articulated in any 
meaningful way with their local hinterlands’. Indeed, there are dark, empty interstices between 
all the bright pathways that might be drawn between the various interconnected nodes of the 
city (Moss, 2008, pp. 438–9). Treated as non-space, these infrastructural cold-spots are the dark 
matter of the urban network: its constitutive other, forgotten about in the disavowal of 
contiguity in favour of connectivity. 
 
The networking of the city has given rise to a sense of the urban environment as complex and 
vulnerable. The city is conceived as a ‘plastic’ (Warf, 1998, p. 255) space in which the 
‘recombinant architectures’ (Mitchell, 1996, pp. 46–105) that are constituted by interconnected 
networks create complex topologies that surpass the simple planar, territorial schemas that 
have dominated military thinking since Clausewitz (Department of the Army, 2006, pp. 2–2 – 2–
5). As such it is a space that offers advantages to insurgent forces by problematising the 
projection of force as it has been traditionally conceived by military planners (that is, in terms 
of mass travelling across a plane). Moreover, the infrastructural density on which this 
complexity is predicated is a vulnerability of contemporary urban life. Dependent as it is on 
various infrastructural pathways, urbanity is vulnerable to disruption and, ultimately, ‘switching 
off’ (Graham, 2005) whether by advanced industrial armies or insurgent forces commandeering 
commercial airliners (Hevesi, 2001, p. 6). The network trope is thus at the heart of the 
urbanisation of security: the nexus of dynamics that both securitise the urban and inflect 
military-security planning/practice with distinctively urban problematics (such as mastering so-
called ‘complex’ urban space). 
 
The elimination of contiguity, and hence the surpassing of territorial schemas, characteristic of 
the network thinking at the heart of the urbanisation of security raise important issues around 
military targeting. Specifically, the norms and rules that have previously governed targeting 
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have rested on notions of contiguity. For example, the norm/rule of proportionality – that any 
destruction should have an effect proportional to the value of eliminating the target – is 
predicated on considerations of contiguity. Indeed, proportionality pertains to the amount (or 
value) of contiguous material destroyed. Only by considering whether the destruction of the 
target outweighs the possible impact on contiguous material, personnel and civilians can 
proportionality have any meaning. Proportionality is thus determined not by the target itself 
but by all that is contiguous to it. However, ‘nodal targeting’ (Mattis, 2008, p. 23) is blind to 
contiguity, seeking to destroy only the connected entities perceived to form a network. The 
concept of proportionality thus becomes fatally compromised. Unable to conceptualise the 
nature of the damage that a strike might cause on contiguous actors, targeting becomes blind 
to the casualties so-called surgical strikes might cause.  
 
Indeed, nodal targeting could be said to increase, not decrease, the destruction visited on 
contiguous civilians and civilian structures. In commenting on the increase in the use of GPS 
directed weapons in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Conetta (2002) notes that:  
Most current GPS directed weapons, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM), are simply less accurate than laser-guided bombs. Indeed, GPS-directed 
weapons are not routinely called "precision" weapons at all, but "accurate" or "near 
precision" ones. Under test conditions, JDAMs have been able to reliably achieve a 
Circular Error Probable (CEP) of approximately 10-13 meters -- meaning that fifty 
percent of the JDAMs dropped will hit within 32-42 feet of their programmed 
coordinates. By comparison, laser-guided bombs routinely achieve CEPs of 3-8 
meters. Even a difference as small as an 8-meter versus a 10-meter CEP equates to 
being able to put 50 percent of expended weapons within a 2100 square foot circle 
versus being able to put them in a circle of 3300 square feet. Should an intended 
target sit among a cluster of buildings, the difference between these two circular 
areas is significant. And, of course, in either case 50 percent of the weapons fall 
outside the circles. 
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Nodal targeting at the start of the Iraq war demonstrates this principle well, with strikes aimed 
at key nodes in the leadership network killing or injuring contiguous civilians (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003, pp. 27–40). However, since the leadership network is conceived in abstraction, 
contiguous civilians are excluded from the targeting calculus. As such, the urbanisation of 
security, suffused as it is with network thinking, is characterised by a deterritorialised 
conception of targeting that leads to extant norms of conflict being compromised. 
 
Flexibility, ambivalence, recombinance 
 
The surpassing of territorial figures through the disavowal of contiguity is, however, only one 
element of network thinking. Indeed, network thinking’s tendency to foreground geometrical-
spatial representations occludes further important assumptions about the nature of the 
elements that are said to comprise networks.  In particular, network thinking makes certain 
assumptions about the nature of the nodes that comprise the targets of network-oriented 
forms of warfighting. Seen through the lens of network thinking, nodes are defined by the 
relations and links for which they comprise a locus. As relations and links change, so does 
nature of the node/loci at which they converge. The network is thus conceived as a flexible 
structure capable of multiple, heterogeneous reiterations. As a consequence, nodes are 
conceived as being capable of articulating multiple, heterogeneous relations/links both 
simultaneously and over time. Nodes are understood to be both multivalent - agnostic about 
the nature or number of connections that link them – and receptive to multiple 
interconnections. The flexibility of a network is thus matched by the promiscuity of its 
constituent nodes: a multivalent engagement in many different relations both at any given time 
and over time. These twin characteristics make recombinance – the capacity for multiple, 
varied reiterations – a key characteristic of networks.  
 
The promiscuity and flexibility of the network is a powerful discursive tool for network thinking. 
The multivalent relational capacity of promiscuous network nodes underscores a discourse 
about the severity of threat posed by networks. Indeed, networks are said to be distinctive and 
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particularly threatening precisely as a consequence of the flexibility of their structures and 
promiscuity of nodes. This discursive positioning of networks as dangerous because of their 
flexibility can be seen in counter-terror discourses. Starting with Arquilla and Ronfeld’s (2001) 
invocation of the hydra, considerations of the threat posed by networks specifically drew 
attention to the manner in which flexibility and the tendency towards recombinance made 
network actors particularly dangerous. For Arquilla and Ronfeld (2001, pp. 12–14) this danger 
stems from three capacities. Firstly, individual elements of a network have an indeterminate 
nature as a consequence of their potential for recombinance. Since an element may play 
multiple different roles in multiple different iterations of a network it is hard to say with 
certainty what its precise function is. This is, of course, in direct contrast to the way in which 
hierarchical, military organisations have traditionally specified their parts very tightly and 
prevented unorthodox recombinations (or multiple possible uses for particular elements). In 
other words, the classical hierarchical organisation reiterates itself in a singular, not multiple 
form. Second, the potential for recombinance means nodes can be replaced. Discursively the 
network is presented as a series of substitutable elements, dangerous precisely because of the 
manner in which any individual element can be replaced to allow the organisation to continue 
functioning.  The danger of this recombinance lies in being purportedly unable to deal a fatal 
blow to an organisation that would prevent it continuing. Instead counter-terror discourse 
portrays its engagement with networks as one that requires sustained attempts at disruption. 
Finally, flexibility allows for omnidirectional attack or, as Arquilla and Ronfeld (2001, p. 12) refer 
it, ‘swarming’. Networks are represented as having the capacity to form and re-form in ways 
that allow them to deliver force(s) from multiple directions – in contrast to the traditional 
military tactic of massing force at a particular location. 
 
The deployment of these purported tropes in counter-terror discourse after the 2001 attacks 
on New York and Washington was common. Al Qaeda was represented as a ‘shadowy network’ 
and much effort was devoted – especially in the field of social network analysis – to mapping 
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the linkages that defined the organisation’s nodes.8 Moreover, al Qaeda was portrayed as a 
resourceful and indefatigable opponent, with reservoirs of recruits to draw upon should any 
particular node be removed. Attention also focused on the recombinant potential that gave al 
Qaeda supposedly superior organisational learning, allowing it to reiterate itself in novel forms 
in response to counter-terror initiatives. Refracted through the onto-epistemological prism of 
network thinking, al Qaeda was represented as dangerous precisely because of the 
recombinant properties of its purported network form.9  
 
Recombinant Resilience  
 
Recombinance resonates with another trope central to contemporary security discourse: 
resilience. Variously understood as the capacity to return from, or master and thrive on, 
disruption, resilience has become a common organising trope for security practitioners as well 
as a central term in security scholarship (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2011, p. 368). 
Originating in ecological science, resilience arose out of dissatisfaction with the idea that 
natural ecosystems were fundamentally in a state of equilibrium (Cote and Nightingale, 2011, p. 
476). While such conceptions viewed responses to disruption in terms of return to an assumed 
equilibrium state, new ecological thinking conceptualised ecosystems in terms of multiple 
equilibria (Cote and Nightingale, 2011, p. 476). Such systems do not respond to disruptive 
events by retuning to a single notional state of equilibrium. Rather, disruption leads a system to 
establish new points of equilibria. As such, ‘ecological resilience is not understood as the 
amount of time that systems take to return to an initial stable state, but the capacity of systems 
to absorb disturbance while retaining the same populations or state variables’ (Cote and 
Nightingale, 2011, p. 476). Resilience is not, however, limited to natural systems. Indeed, even 
within ecological studies there is a realisation that the systems under consideration are better 
                                                 
8 A good example of the ‘shadowy network’ trope can be seen in Colin Powell’s remarks on Hwala 
Finance (Department of Justice, 2001); Social network analysis is best represented by the work of Valdis 
Krebs (2002). 
9 A good example would be the use of the trope of the hydra in counter-terror discourse (Crane, 2002; 
Grint, 2004; Kalic, nd; Wechsler, 2001) to imply the reconfiguration of Al Qaeda after each instance of 
intervention by the US. 
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described as ‘social-ecological systems’ in order to recognise the mutual imbrication of human 
and natural elements (Cote and Nightingale, 2011, p. 475).  
 
While originally intended as a way to recognise the impact of human factors in ecological 
systems, the incorporation of the social has led to thinking about the resilience of social actors: 
specifically individuals and communities. Such ‘social resilience’ has been ‘defined as the ability 
of communities to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure’ (Adger, 2000, p. 
361). Coaffee notes that ‘metaphors of resilience have been used to describe how cities and 
nations attempt to ‘‘bounce-back’’ from disaster’ (Coaffee, 2006, p. 396). Similarly, Lundborg 
and Vaughn-Williams note that resilience implies the capacity to ‘recoil from shocks’ (Lundborg 
and Vaughan-Williams, 2011, p. 376). Referred to by Coaffee and Murakami-Wood (2006, p. 
509) as ‘bouncebackability’ this conception echoes original, ecological conceptions. Such 
accounts imply that social resilience comprises the ability to return to equilibrium after 
disturbance. However, such a conception of resilience could be argued to fail to properly 
capture the complexity of social systems. Society could be said to be a complex system of 
systems with multiple equilibria. As Walker and Cooper (2011, p. 157) demonstrate there is a 
tradition of thinking about complex systems that views resilience not as recoil from disturbance 
back to a ‘normal’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2011, p. 373) state of affairs. Rather, 
writers as diverse as Hayek and Luhmann argue that a ‘complex social system ... thrives upon 
disruptions to its own state of equilibrium’ thus suggesting that it is important to recognise 
‘disequilibrium itself as a principle of organization’ (Walker and Cooper, 2011, p. 157 & 154 
respectively). Walker and Cooper thus trace a shift in security thinking from conceptualising 
security as a conservative logic intended to protect and restore the status-quo, to considering 
security to comprise adaptive capacities for living and thriving in far-from-equilibrium systems. 
Such an account can be found ‘in the creative destruction of a ... Hayekian financial order’ that 
celebrates the opportunities opened up by destabilisation of existing orders and challenges the 
status-quo approaches of, for example, attempts to manage environmental resources. 
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It is precisely through this conception of complex systems operating far from equilibrium that 
network thinking is inextricably linked with conceptions of resilience. Indeed, the network is 
thought to be inherently resilient precisely due to the manner in which its recombinant 
potential allows for an adaptive embrace of disequilibrium. The motif of recombinance implies 
that it is (capacity for) networking per se, not the particular configuration of nodes at any 
particular time, that is important for understanding the potency of al Qaeda style organisations. 
The virulence of this type of violence is said to lie in the manner in which there is a built-in 
substitutability of nodes. While the configuration of actors in any given local instantiation of al 
Qaeda inspired cell may well be somewhat fixed (as such local cells have small numbers and 
thus finite permutations), as a global organisation al Qaeda is portrayed as a shifting set of 
associations and affiliations in which any one group can be replaced with another. This, it is 
proposed, is the strength of the so-called ‘brand’ model of al Qaeda organisation (Zelinsky and 
Shubik, 2009, p. 330). At the heart of the brand model is the conception of local al Qaeda ‘cells’ 
operating nearly autonomously from formal leadership of the organisation. Indeed, what 
matters for the brand-oriented organisation is branding, not hierarchical structure. Indeed, 
symbolic rather than real capital holds such brand-oriented organisations together; association 
with a leadership is less a formal, hierarchical organisational tie, more an affiliation with an idea 
that has global resonance. As such, the brand-oriented organisation is able to recombine in a 
number of configurations. Local cells can be incorporated into a network of affiliated entities as 
long as they are able to articulate their association with the global brand. Brand-oriented 
organisations can thus add new elements and recombine almost infinitely.  
 
However, this is only half the story. Recombinance is significant insofar as it confers particular 
potency on so-called networked terror. Recombinance may – according to counter-terror 
discourses – facilitate growth, flexibility or adaptability of the network and thus make 
networked terror virulent. It also underpins a second aspect attributed to networked terror: its 
resilience. Cells in the brand-oriented organisation are largely substitutable: it is their 
association with the brand (which can be self-ascribed) that is important, not their specific 
character or planned activities. And thus the wider brand-oriented organisation is resilient to 
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disruption. This discursive linking of substitutability and resilience can be seen in the frequent 
deployment of the trope of the hydra in counter-terror discourse. The hydra responds to the 
disruption of losing a head by growing several more (Grint, 2004, pp. 86–88). Similarly al Qaeda 
is said to thrive on disruption, capitalising on the perceived interventionism of western military 
strikes on its members and thus ensuring that the crisis which gave rise to its initial global 
appeal is perpetuated and the flow of new brand-oriented cells maintained.  Network terror is 
thus portrayed as infinitely extendable and resilient to – by thriving on – disturbances. Its 
virulence and potency is thus a consequence of the attributes network thinking perceives to 
characterise its linked, nodal organisational form. 
 
Expansion and omnipresence 
 
This purported resilience of networked terror provokes a dual, pathological response from 
network thought. Firstly, networking thinking attempts to mimic the perceived strengths of the 
enemy it has identified (substitutability, recombinance). Networks were initially acknowledged 
as a key facet of the future battlespace in the late-Cold War doctrine of network centric warfare 
(Cebrowski and Garstka, 1998). In the past twenty years a number of other trends have 
radicalised these early network-centric conceptions. In this period the armed forces of 
advanced industrial states – the US in particular – have been transformed and 
informationalised. Restructured forces have leveraged informational technologies to generate 
gains in agility and lethality. At the same time, in the period since 2003 those forces have faced 
enemies perceived to have gained significant asymmetric advantage from their networked 
capabilities. These trends converged in General Stanley McChrystal’s maxim that ‘it takes a 
network to fight a network’ (McChrystal, 2011).10 As Commander of first Joint Special 
Operations Command and later US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, McChrystal perceived the 
networked resilience of the enemy to demand a networked response (Ackerman, 2011). As 
such, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were refracted through network thinking.  
                                                 
10 Note that the idea that ‘it takes networks to fight networks’ was introduced by Arquilla and Ronfedlt 
(2001, p. 15) 10 years before McChrystal used it. 
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The networking of the war on terror is closely imbricated with a second response to the 
perceived resilience of networked terrorism: the temptation to interdiction and an associated 
extension of battlespace this implies. The disavowal of contiguity and avowal of recombinance 
at the heart of network thinking has had a substantial impact on global counterinsurgency, 
most notably in the emergence of a distinctive global strategy of targeted airstrikes by 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).11 The use of UAVs has expanded significantly from a 
supporting role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to become a campaign in itself ranging from 
the Horn of Africa to Pakistan via Yemen.12 The deployment of UAVs epitomises the temptation 
of interdiction. This temptation rests on a perception that in order to counter resilient, 
networked terror, force must be agile and capable of being routed wherever the enemy is. 
When hybridised with the disavowal of contiguity that underpins network thinking, this gives 
rise to a notion that UAVs should roam globally without regard for territorial determinations of 
space. Deterritorialised recombinance leads to a globalisation of battlespace and a perception 
that a networked response to a networked enemy comprises a form of omnipresence. While 
drones cannot be everywhere at all times, they can both give the impression of ubiquity 
through the capability of covering vast amounts of terrain. As recent comments on the drone 
war in the AFPAK theatre has shown, drones are a constant presence leading to anxiety on the 
ground as to the omnipresent possibility of targeting.13 This extension of battlespace combined 
with a perception that a networked enemy demands an agile and swift response whose 
recombinance outpaces that of the enemy drives a temptation to interdiction evidenced by the 
inexorable expansion of the theatre of operations for drones. 
 
Conclusion: the temptations of interdiction 
                                                 
11 Also referred to as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or colloquially as drones. 
12 For example see the Washington Post database Tracking America's Drone War 
(http://apps.washingtonpost.com/foreign/drones/ accessed 26.11.12) 
13 A good example of the ‘air conditioning’ (Adey, 2010, pp. 170–176) by ever present drones in the skies 
above North West Pakistan and the fear and anxiety it induces can be found in the report Living Under 
Drones (International Human Rights And Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global 
Justice Clinic at NYU School Of Law, 2012) 
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Network thinking thus gives rise to an expansive imaginary of warfighting that is constantly 
tempted towards interdiction. It is this temptation to interdiction that links the urbanisation of 
conflict and the drone war currently being waged across Somalia, Yemen and the AFPAK 
theatre. Each is guided by a notion of resilience that values adaptive embrace of disruption over 
conservative gestures designed to restore the status quo. This adaptive security is driven by a 
perception that the enemy is resilient precisely because of its recombinant potential. In return 
this drives a perception that attempts to combat that enemy must be similarly recombinant, 
ultimately seeking to outperform the enemy’s kinetic velocity. Guided by the notions of 
promiscuous recombinance and the disavowal of contiguity – the twin onto-epistemological 
principles underpinning network thinking – the war on terror has succumbed to a temptation to 
interdiction. The disavowal of contiguity reinforces a fantasy of precision that argues one can 
remove nodal targets from a social-political network without damaging anything surrounding it. 
Once this fantasy for precision – or, more correctly, blindness to civilian risk – has taken root, 
the notion of promiscuous recombinance encourages increasingly wide ranging nodal targeting. 
Indeed, as a state of war, global counterinsurgency is characterised by ceaseless movement 
from one perceived node to the next, regardless of traditional normative or legal boundaries or 
proscriptions.  
 
The temptation to interdiction can be quite clearly seen in the escalation of the use of UAVs: a 
strategy that is gaining not losing pace as the ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
wound down.  UAVs are assemblages (Grayson, 2012, p. 123; Williams, 2011) that, in delivering 
guided munitions, feed a fantasy of precision. Leveraging information technology and 
surveillance networks (both human and machine) in order to identify and remove singular 
nodes in complex socio-politico-military networks, UAVs represent the translation of network 
thinking into military doctrine. The Use of UAVs is a logical conclusion of the temptation to 
interdiction inherent to that network thinking. This temptation towards an escalating, widening 
set of targets can be seen in the plans to use UAVs to grasp the twin problems of complexity 
and networked enemies posed by the urban environment. 
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The largest potential growth area for UAVs is domestic law enforcement (Wall and Monahan, 
2011, pp. 243–245). While some of these drones will be used for surveillance of large rural 
areas hard to access through ground based means, a significant number will be used to patrol 
the skies above urban areas.14 The drone and the city are, when seen through the lens of 
networking thinking, ideally suited for each other. The city is a complex assemblage of critical 
nodes and relationships: it’s dense infrastructure and social relationships have been perceived 
as both vulnerability and strength. Indeed, the networked nature of the urban has led to an 
ambivalence about the deployment of force in its environs.15 In particular the collateral damage 
associated with using force in urban environments has been uppermost in the mind of military 
planners. And yet the fantasy of precision and the disavowal of contiguity central to network 
thinking has re-vivified the idea of urban intervention. Selective, nodal targeting of 
infrastructures and individuals is seen as a legitimate deployment of violence in the war on 
terror. Network thinking is thus legitimating the idea of the city as an arena of combat. 
Conceived through, and subject to, network thinking, the urban is the ideal complement to 
strategies of networked force. Indeed, insofar as it gives rise to the idea that networked threats 
are expansive, contagious and resilient due to their recombinant potential, the global 
interconnection of cites simply multiplies the sense that urban problems require nodal 
responses. The contemporary city is thus deeply imbricated with networked thinking, the two 
intertwined in what I have elsewhere referred to as the ‘urbanisation of security’ (Coward, 
2009). 
 
                                                 
14 It is hard to gauge the extent of drone use by the police and other agencies. In the case of the US the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation has been using Freedom of Information Requests to try and gather such 
information: https://www.eff.org/foia/faa-drone-authorizations. In the UK The Guardian has also made 
(more limited) Freedom of Information Requests (cf. Lewis, 2010; for a response see, Kent Police, 2010) 
The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for approving the use of UAVs in US airspace and has 
gathered public documentation here: http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/. A recent United States 
Government Accountability Office report summarises the state of domestic UAV use (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
15
 The various military perspectives on the deployment of organised force in cities are summarised by Evans (2007).  
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The urbanisation of security is one aspect of the long term trend in global counterinsurgency 
towards networked interdiction. As such, it epitomises the ethical and political problems of 
networked thinking: the expansive temptations it poses and the selective blindness it 
encourages. As those who have sought to counter the use of UAVs have found, international 
law has not been fully equipped to respond to the challenges of network thinking (Grayson, 
2012, pp. 121–122). Designed to limit the ambitions of states and regulate their warfighting, 
international law – especially with its emphasis on proportionality and the protection of 
civilians – is rooted in the territorial thought that network thinking contests. Proportionality, for 
example, is predicated on the notion of contiguity – proscribing force where its effects would 
spill out in a disproportionate manner from the intended target to adjacent individuals or 
materiel. Similarly, the protection of civilians is predicated on the proscription of particular 
zones on the battlefield: areas with no obvious military target. Network thinking’s disavowal of 
contiguity surpasses such conceptions viewing anything regarded to be a node in a threatening 
network as a legitimate target. Targets are not selected despite possible spillover to individuals 
or materiel contiguous to the target.16 Rather the contiguous is simply elided from the purview 
of networking thinking. Orthodox military thought can disregard damage to things and 
individuals contiguous to targets insofar as the rule of proportionality is observed; network 
thinking simply does not factor them into calculations, focusing instead on the nodes and 
relationships that define the network. As such, novel forms of contestation will be required. 
Appeals to human rights, that would apply despite the deterritorialising effect of network 
thinking and the attempt to invoke universal jurisdiction in domestic courts provide one 
nascent route to contesting and potentially disrupting network thinking.17  
 
However, as Marieke de Goede notes (2012, p. 14), network thinking entails a greater danger: 
the seductive lure of the network as a supposed descriptive category for the social sciences and 
humanities. Fields as diverse as the sociology of globalisation, urban studies, political science 
                                                 
16
 It is worth noting that this is despite military targeting becoming increasingly tied to legal protocols and advisers.  
That said, much of the discussion in targeting focuses on the status of the target not that which is contiguous. That 
this is the case is revealed in discussions of civilian casualties which often focus on whether they were the mistaken 
target of strikes, not a consequence of contiguous spillover. 
17
 See for example the attempts by Reprieve to document the drone assemblage  and trace political – and ultimately 
legal – accountability: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/drones/ 
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and international relations have all taken the network as a descriptive term rather than an 
epistemplogical prism through which life is performatively constituted as networked (e.g., 
Castells, 2000; Sassen, 2001; Taylor, 2004). This has led to a valorisation of networked social 
movements as offering transformative potential in an era of globalisation (Keck and Sikkink, 
1999, p. 100). And yet if the temptation to interdiction identified above is inherent to network 
thinking, there will have to be a reconsideration of the utility of the network as either 
descriptive term or critical tool in contesting established social orders. Ultimately, if we are to 
delineate and contest the current state of war, we will need to see the deleterious impact of 
the network as an onto-epistemological trope and find a politics that contests it. 
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